Except for its belated proof of 1 + 1 = 2, Principia Mathematicazz doesn't feature in studies of mathematical humour. Yet there is restrained and understated humour in that work, despite the inauspicious conditions under which it was written. Russell, to take one of the authors, had an irrepressible talent for enlivening his subject matter. This paper explores even the "obscure corners" of PMz to uncover its humour and wit, which, for non-logicians, can be an entree to the work.
world's best sellers." Not that this recipe is a sure way to success. My friend Whitehead and I produced a book having all four requisites that I have just enumerated, but, alas, it never became a best seller. There was one thing that we had forgotten, a thing which both Hitler and Stalin rememberedz-zI mean moral uplift. 3 He otherwise characterized Principiaz as "appear [ing] to lack that philosophic profundity of which obscurity is the most easily recognizable feature."
4 Nevertheless, I think we would agree that Principiaz has its share of obscurity. Russell even admitted this in some pre-publication humour: "It is amusing", he wrote after packing up the 4,000 pages of the manuscript ready by October 1909, "to think how much time and trouble has been spent on small points in obscure corners of the book, which possibly no human being will ever discover."
5 He had no fear that people who read "bits" wouldn't praise the book, "because otherwise they would have been wasting their time."z 6 Like C.xD. Broad, who studied logic under Russell, we may be grateful for "the stimulation of his wit and humour", especially if it opens up Principiaz for us. 7 Russell was very aware of his ability to inject humour into his writings and lectures. G.yH. Hardy spread the word at Cambridge that Russell "was full of jokes". 8 Students attended his lectures "for the jokes and for the thrill of an occasional paradox". 9 Still, I am not going to maintain that Principia Mathematicaz teems with hidden humour. Russell had a grim time writing out the book in Whitehead's absence teaching (and so Russell may be more responsible for the humour than Whitehead, whose Principiaz correspondence is nevertheless very witty). Russell later confessed: "the diUculty and the labour were too great for any pleasure to be possible."
10 "[M]y intellect never quite recovered from the strain." 11 To a young person some 25 years later he reportedly remarked that, due to the level of concentration involved, he "had actually damaged his brain" doing Principia.
12 Russell so dedicated himself to the task that when it came to the supreme diUculty, the Paradox, he was prepared, he says, to spend "the whole of the rest of my life" in solving it. 13 During the years of writing Principiaz he would "stand on the footbridge at Kennington, near Oxford" and feel close to putting himself under the trains.
14 It was during this period that he "gave it [chastity] a good try once, but never again!" 15 No wonder, then, that when he had packed up the manuscript, he felt "more or less as people feel at the death of an ill-tempered invalid whom they have nursed and hated for years." 16 He was not living a life conducive to humour. Yet Russell had already made a good start in rendering mathematics mirthful, or at least witty. In The Foundations of Geometry, in discussing the diTerent spaces of the Flatlanders and the Spherelanders and the possibility of a fourth dimension for us, he commented:
The only people, so far as I know, who have used this analogy, are Dr Abbot and a few Spiritualistsz-zthe former in joke, the latter to explain certain phenomena more simply explained, perhaps, by Maskelyne and Cooke.
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Maskelyne and Cooke are worth knowing about. The former, author of a best-seller on card sharping, combined with the latter, a carpenter who built a "spirit cabinet", to expose a number of frauds perpetrated by spiritualists.
Volume 1 of Principia was published in December 1910. Hardy later reviewed it on the front page of The Times Literary Supplement. He compared Principiaz 's humour with that of The Principles of Mathematicsz :
We may perhaps venture to pick out a minor feature of the book for commendation. It is easy to think, but hard to joke, in symbols; and this volume has not the consistent humour of the Principles of Mathematics. Still, considering the diUculty of the medium, some of the jokes are very good. The best is that per-18 Times Literary Supplement, 7 Sept. 1911, p. 322; reprinted in Hardy's Papers, 7: 862. 19 Though not until 1949. See Russell's correspondence with Cambridge University Press (ra rec. acq. 25). He raised the matter of their subsidy of Volumes 1-111 when cup was on the verge of reprinting the second edition. cup replied that the authors had contributed to the expenses of Volume 1 only. This distinction, which Russell accepted in his next letter, is so nice that it is ipso facto amusing.
20 PoMz , p. 53. Possibly the second actual man (and woman) was a stock example from the temperance movement, which Russell supported at the time.
21 PoMz , p. 287. 22 The Problem of Chinaz (London: Allen and Unwin, 1922), p. 188. petrated at the expense of the law of contradiction. But it would be unfair to the circulation of the book that a reviewer should repeat them; and we leave the reader to discover them for himself.
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The authors long ago 19 were repaid their £50 subsidies for Principiaz 's publication, so I will proceed without fear of harming the book's circulation. As for the consistent humour of the Principles, one joke Hardy may have had in mind is the famous obituary of the concept "a man"z -z not, as Russell says, "an actual man with a tailor and a bank-account or a public-house and a drunken wife". 20 Concepts don't have attributes similar to the things, if any, of which they are concepts. Russell proceeds to the obituary: Hegelians fared poorly in the z Principlesz : "as to what they meant by continuity and discreteness, they preserved a discreet and continuous silence", 21 a remark Russell recalled in the Wlm interview. Monists were not exempted from being the butt of humour in Principiaz , but let us recall that Russell praised Chinese humour for its "restraint and understatement". 22 Gregory Landini Wnds 23 "a logician's joke" in this passage:
We might, of course, have included among our primitive propositions the assumption that more than one individual exists, or some assumption from which this would follow, such as
24 Allowance for monists, or monistic philosophers, is made three other times (PMz 1: 216, 2: 8, 325). At the last passage the authors say that "Our primitive propositions do not suUce to disprove this supposition" (that there is more than one individual, or [at 2: 8] that "the whole universe" consists of a single individual).
All page references to Principia Mathematicaz are to the second edition 512 . This number, he says, will have "about 153 digits". (Kevin Klement tells me the exact number is 155.) He moves on to classes of classes of classes. Here the number of digits will be "about three times 10 152 ". Russell comments: "In a time of paper shortage it is undesirable to write out this number.…" 25 In this remark he combined mathematical acumen, a topical reference, and a gesture of faux patriotism.
We reach at last the collected wit and humour of Principia Mathematica. As we saw, Hardy lowered the reader's expectations. Philip Jourdain, who knew a mathematical joke when he saw one, thought the famous remark about 1 + 1 = 2 might be "the only joke in the book" when he reviewed Volume ii.
26 Hardy had only read Volume 1 by the 27 Russell was fond of nasal examples. In "Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types" (written in 1907), he maintained that you couldn't avoid mentioning a topic by mentioning that you won't mention it: "One might as well, in talking to a man with a long nose, say 'When I speak of noses, I except such as are inordinately long' …" (LK, p. 63; Papersz 5, forthcoming). Thanks to Landini for bringing this example to my attention from Jourdain's The Philosophy of Mr. B*rtr*nd R*ss*lly (London: Allen and Unwin, 1918), p. 77. 28 American Behavioral Scientist 30 (1987): 42-71 (at 47-8, 55). Fry maintains that "certain self-referent paradoxes are central to the nature of humor", and that it's a good thing that Gödel showed "that these paradoxes are inherently unresolvable" (p. 56).
29 Chicago and London: U. of Chicago P., 1980, p. 44. Don't miss Paulos' dialogue, "Groucho Meets Russell", in his I Think, Therefore I Laughz (New York: Columbia U. P., 1985), pp. 10-12, 154-5. time of his review, and what is perhaps the wittiest passage doesn't come until near the end of Volume iii. I'll leave the best for the last.
Readers of the Descriptions section of the Introduction to the Wrst edition will notice the odd example proposition, "the author of Slawkenburgius on Nosesz was a poet" 27 (1: 68). The proposition is false, in Russell's terms, because, as Nick GriUn and Alasdair Urquhart pointed out to me long ago, there is no such book outside of its Wctional reference in Tristram Shandy. If you read Lawrence Sterne, you'll Wnd that the nonexistent book has a Latin title, three pages of "original" Latin text, and several more pages of English translation. Perhaps Russell enjoyed the idea that parts of a non-existent book could be read.
There is an element of self-reference in this passage, but it is not what William F. Fry, Jr. in his article "Humor and Paradox", identiWed as a dominant theme in humour, instancing Principiaz 's attempt to avoid selfreferential (or vicious-circle or illegitimate) totalities.
28 So far as I can discover, Principia avoids self-referential humour. Not a single joke comes at the expense of illegitimate totalities, despite the lure of such fun. Yet this kind of joke has been dubbed "Russell jokes" in Mathematics and Humor by John Allen Paulos (who was a late correspondent of Russell's). 29 Russell jokes are deWned as those "whose logical underpinning is some version of Russell's paradox or its resolution". In factz -z perhaps in deference to the seriousness of the theory of typesz -z Russell very seldom indulges in illegitimate totalities. But the lure was irresistible when it came to reviewing Bergson's little book, Laughterz , before Volume ii of Principiaz appeared. Russell declined to extend the theory of types to Bergson's laughter formula about humans behaving mechani- cally, when he concluded his review as follows: "Every formula treats what is living as if it were mechanical, and is therefore by his own rule itself a Wtting object of laughter." 30 The application of the theory of types would make such logical humour impossible.
Nevertheless, Jourdain had his alter ego for Russell indulge in a superb "Russell joke", namely the multi-level jest involving several Scotsmen in the short chapter, "The Hierarchy of Jokes". 31 There is surely suUcient reason to credit Russell with embellishing this joke about the 37 protoAryan jokes and the means of avoiding thereby a vicious-circle fallacy. Russell had privately in 1911 caricatured some Scots for an alleged dull sense of humour when he encountered them in his classes. 32 There's more substantial evidence. The Wrst-level basis of the joke came from Gilbert Murray. "He assured me once", Russell recollected in 1958, "that there was an Oxford don who had reduced all jokes to 37 proto-Aryan originals and, when anybody made a joke in his presence, he would say, 'Yes. There is that joke.'z " 33 The story is a joke at the next level. Jourdain's wittily phrased rendition has four levels, with the Wrst three involving the unfortunate Scotsmen and the fourth being about the Wrst three, all suitably nested. The story ends with an analysis of the topics concerned in the lower levels and of who enjoys such jokes. Jokes of 34 higher levels require "a sound logical training", "while jokes of transWnite order presumably only excite the inaudible laughter of the gods." 34 We may conclude that Russell was not above Russell jokes, at least during the euphoria of publishing Principia.
The joke on the law of contradiction,
is in the summary on page 111 of Volume 1: "in spite of its fame", the authors comment, "we have found few occasions for its use." Maybe the PMy@z 100 conference will tell us why that is. Incidentally, Russell maintained an immense index of where propositions were used in Principia.
It is easy to conWrm how seldom the law of contradiction's number was employedz -z only at  22.89 and in the demonstration of  60.33. 35 Jourdain, in his joke-book on Russell, also noticed the passage.
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Wit and humour give a book life, but not all that gives a book life is witty or humorous. In a work of the most rigorous symbolic reasoning, this reason is oTered once: "because life is too short." That is why a person cannot assert all the non-intensional functions of fz !ẑ zz (1: 73). Principiaz is populated by polar explorers, the featherless biped of the Principlesz ("xz has two legs and no feathers" [1: 23, 73]), Adam and Eve (1: 546, 579), Christians and Mohammedans and their respective sets of wives (i: 299), Socrates, Plato and Aristotle (passimz 37 ), an important "imaginary sceptic" (i: 38), white employers in relation 38 to "coloured" employees (1: 265, a political remark dating from the Wimbledon byelection?), rich fathers of Etonian sons (i: 281), and the sons of Cabinet ministers (az ) and sons of foolish male parents (by). The emptiness of their intersection is symbolized in the summary of  72.411: ay"ybz y=yL.
Mysteriouslyz (the relation of son to father being many-one), If we make Rz the relation of son to parent (which is not many-one), it no longer
